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Marko ala-Fossi
10. Digital Divergence of Terrestrial Broadcasting systems 
in Europe
Although the European Union’s official target date for digital switchover 
of broadcasting in 2012 is approaching, analogue broadcasting is not 
in immediate danger of extinction in Europe. This is mostly because 
the EU digital switchover plan does not apply at all to radio. The 
most paradoxical case is perhaps Finland, which was among the very 
first to switch off analogue television in 2007, but currently has no 
intention to implement digital radio. Originally, in the 1980s, radio 
was supposed to be the first mass media worldwide to go digital using 
the new European technology with mobile multimedia capabilities 
for Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB). Research for digital radio also 
provided the technological basis for Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) 
when the development of digital television in Europe began seriously, 
following an American breakthrough in the 1990s. A new European 
system for mobile television (DVB-H) was developed after Japan had 
introduced its digital broadcasting system with mobile television serv-
ices. This chapter seeks to examine the development of these digital 
terrestrial broadcasting systems from the perspective of the political 
economy (Mosco 1996). It studies the intermedial and international 
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relations between radio and television technology development projects 
in Europe, the US and Japan in the context of socio-political change 
shaped by neoliberalist policies and the marketisation of broadcasting 
during the last 30 years. 
Besides being reactive rather than proactive and not truly com-
prehensive, the European project for digitalisation of broadcasting has 
not resulted in any significant convergence between broadcast media. 
Instead, if we take into account all existing and, for the most part, 
incompatible European broadcasting systems for terrestrial digital 
radio, mobile multimedia and television with their latest update ver-
sions, the number is closer to ten – and the situation becomes even 
more complicated if the rivalling systems from the US and Japan 
are also included. However, after a historical analysis, this is actually 
not surprising. The policies and politics for developing new digital 
broadcasting technologies were driven by strong economic motives 
from the very beginning, but not by intentions for any digital media 
convergence. Broadcasters in Europe – and everywhere else – were 
more interested in maintaining the existing structures than merging 
mediums together. 
DVB digital television can be considered as the only relatively suc-
cessful part of the European broadcast digitalisation project, especially 
when compared with the development of DAB digital radio (Iosifidis 
2011, O’Neill et al. 2010). This is largely due to the so-called digital 
television paradox (Galperin 2004): both national governments and 
international organisations have in many ways heavily promoted the 
migration to digital television despite the simultaneous ideological, 
legal and regulatory transition from political to more market-driven 
solutions in order to ensure certain vital political and economic in-
terests. Consequently, although these two major European digital 
broadcasting standards were meant to be complementary, digital radio 
had in every aspect less to offer than digital television, and DVB clearly 
defeated DAB in an intermedial competition over political support 
and available economic resources.
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In other words, the idea of digital media convergence between 
‘radio bits’ and ‘TV bits’ (Negroponte 1995: 54) was primarily just 
an afterthought within digital broadcasting system development. As 
a result of continuing divergence between broadcast media, most 
radio is still analogue, and DAB ‘has drifted to today’s inertia’ (Kroes 
2011). In a truly converged broadcasting landscape, only one digital 
switchover would have been enough. 
High-tech rivalry with better analogue TV – and digital radio
 
The basis for profound socio-political changes reshaping European 
broadcasting was laid in the early 1970s, when the so-called ‘golden age 
of capitalism’ turned into ‘the Long Downturn’, a long-term decline of 
industrialised capitalist economies after the oil crisis. Earlier Keynesian 
fiscal and monetary policies based on the state interventions into the 
market did not work against stagflation, and the governments were 
forced to seek new ways to fight the economic crisis. By the end of 
the decade, when the conservative governments of Reagan in the US 
and Thatcher in the UK came to power, the neoliberalist approach 
of reducing both public spending and government control over the 
markets had become the new dominant economic policy paradigm of 
the advanced capitalist world (Harvey 2005: 18–34, Hesmondhalgh 
2007: 82–86).
Germany and some other European countries like Finland had 
adopted FM broadcasting on a large scale as early as the 1950s, but in 
the US and Japan, FM radio did not become commercially significant 
until the late 1960s. By that time, the worldwide sales of Japanese Hi-fi 
sound equipment with new FM Stereo radio tuners were booming, 
but television manufacturing in Japan was clearly in need of a new 
competitive edge against even cheaper East-Asian production. Like 
practically all national public service broadcasters at that time, Japanese 
NHK had – and still has – a technical research laboratory, which was 
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striving to improve the quality of the delivery as well as the avail-
ability of public broadcasting services. The NHK engineers had not 
been satisfied with the picture quality of the American NTSC colour 
television during the Tokyo Olympics, so they started to develop a 
visual equivalent to Hi-fi sound: Hi-Vision – an analogue system for 
High Definition Television (HDTV). This was exactly what the major 
Japanese electronics manufacturers were looking for, so they formed 
a national coalition with NHK for developing HDTV in 1970 (Ala-
Fossi 2005: 100,149, Curwen 1994: 17, Hart 2004: 84).
In Europe, the BBC R&D department was already more interested 
in expanding analogue services with digital systems. The BBC was able 
to develop the first digital audio system for relaying programme feed 
between transmitters in the early 1970s. A few years later, the BBC in-
troduced a new textual data extension to analogue television – Teletext 
– and took part within the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 
the pre-development for textual services in analogue FM radio using 
‘VHF radio data’, later know as Radio Data System (RDS). Further 
BBC technical research during the 1980s resulted in NICAM, a digital 
stereo broadcasting system for television sound, which, however, was 
suited only for fixed reception. The new digital additions were well in 
line with the public service organisation and ideology: they did not blur 
established boundaries between radio and television but provided new 
or better quality information services for the public, free of additional 
charge (Ely and Eng 1981, Lax 2010: 77, Ala-Fossi 2010: 45–46). 
However, implementing these new services for the public also required 
close co-operation with electronics manufacturers.
In the US, national public service broadcasting had been only 
recently  (1967) established, and the formerly mighty developers of 
broadcast technology, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), had severely declined since 
their glory days. It is perhaps illustrative that American companies had 
made several efforts since the 1960s to introduce an  analogue home 
video system, but the VHS system of  JVC from Japan defeated all its 
rivals in the US market by the late 1970s – and, within a few years, 
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everywhere else as well (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995, Abramson 2003: 
212–216). The biggest surviving losers, Sony (Betamax/Japan) and 
Philips (VCR/the Netherlands), decided to join forces in developing a 
new digital format for audio recordings, later known as Compact Disc 
(CD). The new standard was introduced in 1980, although the first 
commercial audio recordings were not released until 1982 (Soramäki 
1990: 76, Immink 1998). The rare Euro-Japanese CD project had a 
fortunate timing because, by the early 1980s, Japan was more common-
ly seen in the Western world as a threat rather than a companion 
(O’Connor 2009).
Interestingly enough, the original initiative for developing a new 
digital radio system did not come from the electronics industries 
looking for new markets, but again from public service broadcast-
ers. All the new digital extensions of analogue broadcasting – and 
especially the possibilities created by the new CD records – obviously 
inspired the technical research department of German public service 
broadcasters, Institut für Rundfunktechnik (IRT). In 1981, they be-
gan pre-development of a digital broadcasting system that could also 
deliver the pure new digital sound in mobile reception better than FM. 
IRT was primarily working on audio bit-rate reduction, while at the 
same time in France, the Centre Commun d’Études de Télévision et 
Télécommunications (CCETT), a joint organisation of the French 
public service broadcaster (ORTF) and the national research centre 
in telecommunications, was developing a completely new digital 
multicarrier transmission system (OFDM). By the mid-1980s, these 
two organisations had created together what Gandy (2003) calls ‘the 
embryo’ of digital audio broadcasting, though they were still far away 
from a functional digital radio system (O’Neill 2010: 32, Gandy 2003, 
Schulze and Lüders 2005, Immonen 1999).
After the first public tests with the new Hi-Vision system in the 
early 1980s, NHK had modified its original design to match better 
with American requirements. So in April 1985, the US Department 
of State decided to support the NHK proposal for HDTV as the 
world standard. For American broadcasters, wide-band HDTV was a 
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good excuse to keep mobile radio communications out of the vacant 
broadcast channels – and there was not much domestic TV manu-
facturing left to protect, while a single global TV standard was seen 
as a benefit for the US movie industry (Hart 1994: 215, Brinkley 
1998: 16–19, Hart 2004: 196, Alvarez et al. 1999). However, the 
fear of NHK’s commercial allies both from Japan and the US made 
the European Commission (EC) and other European stakeholders 
like national broadcasters oppose the NHK initiative and suggest a 
different approach at the meeting of the Consultative Committee of 
International Radio (CCIR) in May 1986. EUREKA, the new pan-
European organisation for research and development coordination 
established by 17 European states and the EC, proved to be a useful 
tool in this neomercantilist project for defending European electronics 
industries against the Japanese Hi-Vision. The development project 
(Eureka 95) for the European version of HDTV was launched in July 
1986 as one of the largest strategic projects of the new consortium. 
Major European electronics manufacturers, such as the French state-
owned Thomson, Germany’s Bosch Group, and the main coordinator, 
Philips, were centrally involved in the project along with the technical 
research organisations of several European public service broadcasters 
and the EBU (Sandholtz 1992, Hart 2004: 126–127, Soramäki and 
Okkonen 1999: 29–30, Evain 1995: 39).
Only six months later, the same three major European manufac-
turers were joined by the BBC, IRT and CCETT to launch another 
Eureka project (Eureka 147), this time coordinated by the German 
Space Agency (DLR). The development project of a Digital Audio 
Broadcasting (DAB) system was, without any doubt, another part of 
the European counterattack (Ala-Fossi 2010: 46, Evain 1995: 39). 
The original Eureka project form even states that ‘the drawing up of a 
new digital audio broadcasting standard will therefore provide a long 
term counterbalance to the increasing dominance of the countries of 
the Far East in the consumer electronics sector’. When envisioning 
the additional data and multimedia transmission capabilities of DAB 
technology, it also refers to the concept of ‘integrated services digital 
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broadcasting’ (ISDB), an idea of a multipurpose digital broadcasting 
system drafted at NHK in the early 1980s. However, the original main 
focus in DAB development was not to enhance radio with multime-
dia, but to create a digital replacement technology for FM radio with 
superb sound and robust mobile reception (Yoshino 2000, Eureka 
1986, O’Neill 2009).
It seems that, in the 1980s, the future of European broadcasting 
was seen as strictly media-specific and even divergent. Although radio 
was supposed to be the first mass media to go digital, the future of 
television was still thought to be not only separate, but also analogue. 
The HDTV systems of the 1980s are often presented as direct precur-
sors to digital television, but both Hi-Vision and European HD-MAC 
(Multiplexed Analogue Components) were basically just advanced 
analogue television systems, as their names suggest. Both systems, 
however, complemented analogue HD video with digital sound, in 
the same way as ordinary analogue TV in Europe was already using 
digital NICAM stereo. It should also be noted that the HD-MAC 
was designed to be a swift counter-proposition to block the Japanese 
initiative. At that time in the late 1980s, developing a completely digital 
television system was still seen primarily as a theoretical option for the 
future, which is why it could not have been seriously considered as a 
useful short-term defence strategy. 
The unexpected end of the analogue future
The concept of an ‘information society’ (johoka shakai) as well as the 
idea of increasing importance of knowledge in the development of a 
post-industrial society had been introduced respectively in Japan and in 
the US by the early 1960s. But it was not until the early 1970s, when 
a growing need to find new ways to improve national competitive-
ness and the new reports commissioned by the Japanese government 
about the forthcoming social impacts of computerisation inspired the 
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first wave of the information society debate. National planning for 
technology development started in the advanced capitalist societies 
following the Japanese example, and one of the most influential results 
of this work in Europe was L’Informatisation de la société (1978) by 
Simon Nora and Alain Minc. They introduced a whole new concept 
of telematics to describe the increasing interconnection of computing 
and telecommunications. Based on the report, the French govern-
ment launched a development project for Minitel, the first online 
videotext service, which was introduced in 1982 (Nevalainen 1999: 
7–8, Huuhtanen 2001: 4–6, 34, Karvalics 2008: 29–32). It is perhaps 
not very surprising that broadcasting was not yet in any central role 
in these early European visions of an information society (Garnham 
1996: 107–108).
However, by that point, the broadcasting sector had also become 
a target of neoliberalist, market-driven reforms reducing the earlier 
government control and regulatory power of the political system. The 
deregulation of broadcasting actually started in the late 1970s when 
private radio was first introduced in the UK and in Italy, while the 
Carter administration in the US repealed several radio and broadcast 
regulations. This was further intensified in the US after the Reagan 
administration took over and the new chair of the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), Mark S. Fowler, started to replace 
regulatory practices in broadcasting with market-oriented solutions 
(Ala-Fossi 2005: 104–105). In most Western European countries, the 
long era of national public broadcasting monopolies came to an end, 
and the remaining radio monopolies throughout Europe fell by the 
end of the 1980s. Thanks to regulatory reform, the availability of the 
free FM spectrum and new, relatively inexpensive FM radio equip-
ment, the number of new private stations exploded so that, by the 
early 1990s, there were already about 4000 local and regional radio 
stations in Europe (Vittet-Philippe and Crookes 1985: 8–10, Wedell 
and Crookes 1991: 9–21, Humphreys 1996: 111, 125–128).
But even a significant reduction of political regulation of electronic 
communications was not enough for some advocates for neoliberalism 
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like Peter Jay in the UK, who suggested in 1981 that the development 
of technology would soon remove grounds for any government inter-
ference for ‘electronic publishing’ (Jay 2005 [1981]: 79–88, Garnham 
1982: 285–286). In this political context, a like-minded media theorist 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Ithiel de Sola 
Pool, formulated an argument for further deregulation of all media 
based on technological change. According to de Sola Pool (1983), new 
electronic technology was bringing all forms of media together into 
‘one grand system’, and because this convergence of modes was making 
the historically developed, media-specific regulation of US communi-
cations systems obsolete, this potentially harmful practice should be 
completely abandoned (de Sola Pool 1983: 7–8, 28, Aufderheide 1999: 
23, Comor 1999: 1056, Briggs and Burke 2005: 210). So, convergence 
as a force merging all media was already in the beginning an ideological 
interpretation of the consequences of technological development and 
a political tool rather than a solid theoretical concept, and its value 
for analysis (Fagerjord and Storsul 2007: 29) has not increased over 
the years (see also Herkman in this volume).
After the European opposition had prevented the adoption of 
the NHK system as the worldwide HDTV standard in 1986, the 
US government agencies and electronic industry reconsidered their 
strategies and set up new initiatives for domestic HDTV technology 
research. In 1987, the FCC started to look for industry proposals of 
a backwards compatible analogue HDTV, which would provide a 
reduced quality picture to all standard TV receivers while delivering 
HD to new, advanced receivers. Within the US broadcast industry, 
fully digital television was seen as an impossible goal, although several 
MIT professors continued urging for digital solutions and the complete 
integration of computers into television sets (Neuman 1988, Brinkley 
1998: 93–95, Neil 2010). After a small San Diego division of General 
Instruments (GI), VideoCipher, made a breakthrough in developing 
an all-digital HDTV system in early 1990, the FCC and the US 
industry switched their approach from analogue to digital. GI soon 
allied with MIT in order to develop a computer-compatible digital 
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HDTV system with progressive image scanning – and suddenly, the 
US had taken the lead in the race for the future of television. By May 
1993, seven developers from four rivalling American digital systems 
joined forces in the Digital HDTV Grand Alliance (Brinkley 1998: 
120–134, Galperin 2004: 74–78, Alvarez et al. 1999: 6–10, Negro-
ponte 1995: 37–40).
Meanwhile in Europe, the HD-MAC system was in trouble de-
spite its intergovernmental support and the deep involvement of the 
European Commission courtesy of a special mandating directive. The 
analogue technology was expensive, prone to interference, required a 
broad spectrum and was not appealing for the increasing number of 
private broadcasters. The first unofficial studies for digital television 
systems in Europe were started in 1991, quite soon after receiving 
the news from the US. In the Olympic year of 1992, HD-MAC was 
not a success, even in the consumer markets as it had originally been 
planned, but the European Commission was still ready to pour in more 
money and a new directive in order to save the project. However, the 
British government strongly opposed these plans, and after Martin 
Bangemann became responsible for the European technology policies 
in the new Commission of 1993, the EU finally abandoned  analogue 
HDTV and launched a new industry–led project for Digital Video 
Broadcasting (DVB) in Europe (Galperin 2004: 132–134, Näränen 
2006: 42–43, Kemppainen 2008: 32–35).
According to Galperin (2004), the failure of the HD-MAC sys-
tem was an important turning point both for European broadcasting 
policies and technology initiatives in general. Because an alliance of 
national governments, public broadcasters and major manufacturers 
together with the European Commission had not been able to make a 
migration to HDTV happen, it was obvious that a new approach was 
needed. On the European level, the neomercantilist high-tech rivalry 
of the previous decade was replaced with more market-driven, neolib-
eral policies drafted in the Bangemann report (EC 1994), promoting 
less intergovernmental arrangements with national champions over 
increasingly complicated broadcasting markets and more reliance on 
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private standards development (Galperin 2004: 133–135, Michalis 
2007: 149–151). On the industry level, the failure of HD-MAC was 
also seen as a result of being a technology-led project, indicating a 
need for a more consumer-driven approach (Fagan 1994). Finally, 
it also made the Commission reluctant to openly support any single 
technology, and a few years later led to the adoption of the principle 
of technological neutrality (Lembke 2002: 227, 240).
Digital television as a strategic supplement
Despite the dramatic transition of broadcasting policies, regulatory 
practices and even industry structures of European radio broadcasting, 
changes did not happen overnight. In some European countries like 
France and Italy, public service radio had lost its leading position to 
smaller private stations very rapidly. However, in the UK and Germany, 
public service broadcasters BBC and ARD still dominated their domes-
tic radio broadcasting markets in 1991 (Vittet-Philippe and Crookes 
1985: 67, Wedell and Crookes 1991: 21–35, 182–200, Humphreys 
1996: 159–199). In addition, the voices of new private and commer-
cial radio broadcasters were not heard on the European level until the 
establishment of the Association of European Radios (AER) in 1992 
and its emergence into political activity by the mid-1990s (Lembke 
2002: 219–220). It is no wonder that the DAB development remained 
firmly in the hands of public service broadcasters and electronics 
manufacturers, while no private radio broadcasters were involved in 
either of the two phases of Eureka 147, the project developing DAB 
digital radio in 1987–1991 and 1992–1994 (Rissanen 1993).
The new DAB digital radio system was thought to be superior 
over analogue radio systems by not only improving but expanding 
radio: it was able to deliver several programmes for mobile reception 
with high-quality audio and additional services (but no video) using 
only a single transmitter. However, using multiplexing for delivering 
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several programme channels at the same time through one transmitting 
channel and the Single Frequency Network (SFN) for occupying only 
a single frequency in the available spectrum (Hoeg and Lauterbach 
2003), which made sense for public service broadcasters in large-
scale nationwide and regional broadcasting, were rather ill-fitted for 
local and small-scale broadcasters in the increasingly complex radio 
landscape of the 1990s. The first warning signal came when the US 
radio industry decided to develop its own digital radio system based 
on the existing frequency allocations despite the National Association 
of Broadcasters (NAB) giving an initial endorsement of DAB in 1991. 
The European system design reflected the old power structures of the 
European public broadcasting system, and it was considered to be 
too risky for the economic stability of American radio markets (Ala-
Fossi and Stavitsky 2003: 62–67, 74). The serious mismatch between 
DAB and local radio was also pointed out in a report for the Council 
of Europe (Gronow et al. 1992) two years before DAB was formally 
recognised as an official standard for digital radio at the end of 1994, 
but no changes were made – and even the European spectrum alloca-
tions for digital radio in Wiesbaden 1995 were tailored for national 
and regional broadcasting.
The early 1990s were also a turning point for wireless telecom-
munication, especially mobile cellular telephony. The first commer-
cially deployed digital mobile telephone system was the European 
GSM standard, which soon became very successful. Within 10 years 
after the first commercial GSM call was made in Finland in 1991, the 
system had 500 million subscribers worldwide (GSM World 2011). 
The development of computer technologies, which later became the 
basis for the Internet, had started in the US in the mid-1960s, but 
during the 1970s and 1980s, these new technologies did not yet have 
any implications for broadcasting. Actually, the Internet began to have 
serious effects on traditional media only after the introduction of the 
World Wide Web in 1992 and the first web browser in 1993 (Henten 
and Tadayoni 2008: 49–51).
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All this happened at the same time as the second coming of the 
information society agenda, which was primarily inspired by the US 
National Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative, officially launched 
by the newly elected Clinton administration in September 1993. The 
vision about the ‘information superhighway’ was largely based on the 
ideas of the development of computer technology and the Internet, but 
the American concept of digital TV was also identified from the very 
beginning as an essential part of the new US government strategy. In 
a society where more households had television sets than telephones or 
personal computers, it was expected that a new interactive form of dig-
ital television could provide a more natural gateway to the information 
society (Huuhtanen 2001: 24, Aufderheide 1999: 43, Galperin 2004: 
37–39, Negroponte 1995: 42–43, 54). A group of MIT academics 
and the US computer industry, most notably Apple Computers, had 
been persistently promoting the compatibility of the new US digital 
television standard with the existing computer technology, so the NII 
and the new agenda inspired by it matched with the earlier visions of 
the electronic convergence of all media (Hart 2004: 155, 165, Neil 
2010). However, US broadcasters were reluctant to abandon their 
traditional interlaced display formats, so the preconditions for digital 
convergence did not exist until the Advanced Television Systems Com-
mittee (ATSC) standard was approved by the FCC in December 1996 
(Brinkley 1998: 393).
In order to protect the competitiveness of its own member states, 
the European Union reacted rapidly to the NII initiative, and in De-
cember 1993, the Delors White Paper suggested a large development 
programme for telecommunications, computer networks and other 
information infrastructure in Europe. The European Council warmly 
supported the ideas and asked for an implementation plan, which was 
then prepared under Commissioner Martin Bangemann. While the 
information society hype took over broadcasting in the audiovisual 
Green Paper of 1994, a few months later the Bangemann report more 
or less adapted the American NII programme for the European Com-
munity and gave a series of recommendations for the member states 
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on how to pursue the information society. In addition, the report also 
included the development of digital television (interactive video) into 
the European action plan (Michalis 2007: 164–165, Galperin 2004: 
39–40, 134–135). Interestingly, digital radio was not even mentioned 
in the Bangemann report (1994) although it already existed, unlike 
digital television; even in the European Green Paper on Convergence 
(1997), there is only one reference made to multimedia digital radio 
(EC 1994, EC 1997: 5). 
As already noted, by the time the DVB project for European digital 
television began in September 1993, DAB was almost completed as 
the standard for digital radio with narrowband channels and no video 
codec. It was thought to be superior new European digital technology 
for audio broadcasting, so instead of any re-evaluation or reform of 
the nearly finished system, it made more sense to supplement it with 
an equally superior digital system for video broadcasting. On the 
other hand, it was also reasonable to utilise all the existing European 
research on digital broadcasting for digital television development. 
This is why DVB digital television has many technical similarities to 
DAB digital radio, including multiplexing and SFN, and in certain 
conditions ‘DVB-T is effectively a wide bandwidth version of the 
DAB system’ (Laven 1998: 5–6). However, these two closely related 
European digital broadcasting systems were also intentionally made 
incompatible with each other. 
There was no particular desire in Europe to merge the new dig-
ital broadcast systems despite the increasing popularity of the idea of 
convergence and the awareness of the Japanese concept of ISDB. The 
national public broadcasters still had strong and strictly separate radio 
and television organisations with their own distinctive development 
strategies, and the members of the EBU considered the two digital 
systems mostly as independent digital replacements of the two analogue 
broadcasting systems. In addition, the new consumer-driven approach 
led the DVB developers to aim at what the majority of consumers 
were expecting from television. Instead of very high quality pictures, 
DVB offered more channels to provide more choice (Fagan 1994), 
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and because most people were not watching television on the move, 
DVB (-T) was designed for fixed roof-top antenna reception of video 
on wideband channels, while mobile reception capability was ignored 
on purpose (Yamada 2006: 28). So, when DVB was approved as an 
official standard in 1995, it was intentionally inappropriate for mobile 
use and rather uneconomic for any radio-type services (Baumgartner 
2005: 1–2, Wood 1995, Wood 2001: 2, Laven 1998: 5–6).
Converging vs. competing digital broadcasting systems
In Japan, abandoning analogue Hi-Vision after investing money and 
effort in it for over 20 years was a very difficult process. Although 
NHK laboratories set up a whole new department for research on 
digital broadcasting methods in 1991 (Yamada 2006: 32), by 1994 
most Japanese politicians and industry leaders were officially still 
backing analogue HDTV (Fagan 1994, Negroponte 1995: 37–40, 
Hart 2004: 199–203). The head of the new NHK digital broadcast-
ing research department, Osamu Yamada, had become interested in 
OFDM and the European DAB project in the late 1980s because of 
its capability to provide robust mobile reception. After he discovered 
in 1992 that both the Europeans and the Americans had intentionally 
left mobile reception outside of their respective standard specifications 
for digital television, mobile reception using OFDM was made one 
of the cornerstones of the new Japanese digital broadcasting system 
(Yamada 2006: 28).
Another new competitive advantage was found in Japan from the 
earlier concept of ISDB by developing the new system as an integrated 
digital platform instead of the media-specific approach adopted both 
in Europe and the US. By utilising already existing research on digital 
broadcasting, the Japanese were able to introduce the technical speci-
fications of their new digital broadcasting system in 1997. ISDB-T 
has several technical commonalities with both DAB and DVB, but 
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thanks to its convergent technological approach on digital broadcasting, 
it was able to offer mobile reception of both radio and television in 
standard quality as well as in HD format, unlike its European relatives 
(Yokohata 2007: 1, Nakahara 2003: 5, 27, 30–33, Miyazawa 2004: 6, 
26, Kim 2003). In this way, it was able to challenge the conventional 
conceptions of both broadcast television and radio.
The ISDB approach was possible mainly because radio and tel-
evision were not treated as completely separate entities with unique 
identities, but rather as two forms of broadcast media based on different 
degrees of technical complexity. From the Japanese perspective, radio 
was also in every way a minor and subordinate media when compared 
to television (Kato 1998: 177), and there was no demand for another 
separate DAB-type system for digital radio, either. However, this in-
tegrated digital platform blurring the traditional boundaries between 
radio and television seems to be rather a common ground for both new 
and old types of broadcast media than a basis for a single converged 
medium in itself.
By the end of the 1990s, it had become obvious that the European 
strategy of creating two complementary digital broadcasting systems 
had resulted in a situation where DAB was in fact competing with DVB 
over political and industrial support in Europe. Some people were so 
impressed by DVB that they proposed it for all digital broadcasting. 
The EBU was able to defend DAB by pointing out that because the 
systems were designed to be complementary, they could not possibly 
substitute each other (Laven 1998, Wood 2001). The former head of 
the EBU technical department, David Wood, even stated that ‘ulti-
mately, radio is likely to survive and prosper better in the digital age, 
if it is the master of its own environment’ (Wood 2001: 3). However, 
the odds turned against DAB partly for the same reasons, which, ac-
cording to Galperin (2004: 25–27), supported the rapid implementa-
tion of terrestrial DVB and causing the digital TV paradox: 1) DAB 
and DVB were both results of a pan-European project for saving the 
electronics industry in Europe, but digital radio was always more like 
a by-product than the actual centrepiece of the European high-tech 
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counterattack. This is quite understandable considering the smaller 
economic and political importance of radio. Its increasingly fragmented 
markets did not help much in its competition for support with DVB, 
either. 2) While digital (interactive) television was seen as an ideal way 
to overcome the digital divide and bring the information superhighway 
to every home, digital radio was hardly even mentioned in the most 
influential visions of the new information society, just as there would 
not be any primarily audio-oriented communication in the future. 3) 
Migration to DVB was going to create significant a digital dividend 
for rapidly growing mobile telephony services by packing television 
broadcasting into smaller space in the radio spectrum, while it simul-
taneously provided more channels for television. Although full-scale 
migration to DAB could have also created some vacant spectrum in 
the long run, the relative benefit per channel was going to be much 
smaller, and the telecom industry was not very interested in taking 
over the FM band, where  a rather wide selection of radio channels in 
most cases already existed in the late 1990s. In addition, the recently 
adopted technological neutrality principle provided a politically correct 
excuse for ‘letting the market decide’.
These issues made EU institutions and most European govern-
ments pushing DVB not give much ideological, legal or political 
support for DAB by the turn of the century despite the joint efforts 
of AER, EBU, WorldDAB Forum and the European Association 
of Consumer Electronics Manufacturers (EACEM) (Lembke 2002: 
212–240). For example, in Finland, when the formal decision about 
digitalisation of all broadcasting was made by the Council of State in 
May 1996, DAB radio was expected to make its breakthrough in the 
consumer markets many years before DVB television, which required 
much larger investments (Mykkänen 1995: 20–22). However, within 
three years, it became clear that both the stakes and rewards for suc-
cessful migration to digital television were much higher, while the im-
plementation of digital radio was in practice much more difficult than 
originally expected. Nokia abandoned DAB in 1997, and two years 
later, the Finnish government as well as most of the broadcast industry 
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concentrated their efforts on supporting the implementation of DVB 
(Heikkilä 1999: 9, Lax et al. 2008: 156–157, Ala-Fossi 2011).
By 1998, the increasing importance of the Internet as a converged 
digital media platform and the first ISDB field trials with mobile TV 
experiments in Japan made European developers of digital televi-
sion understand that digital broadcasting could offer more than just 
traditional media concepts – and that they actually may have made a 
strategic mistake by excluding mobile reception from the DVB stand-
ard. The very first prototype of a European mobile TV receiver was 
quickly put together at Nokia’s DVB unit in Turku, Finland. Nokia 
also participated in setting up a new EU-supported project (AC318 
Motivate) to develop a European system for mobile television and to 
compete against ISDB (Kemppainen 2008: 23, Torikka 2007, Motivate 
1998, Talmola 2005: 2).
As noted earlier, the DVB system was based on an assumption 
that the receivers would always have a mains connection and a rooftop 
antenna, so their power consumption was quite high, and mobile 
reception was unreliable (Torikka 2007, Högmander 2003). The 
Nokia Turku unit solved these problems by dividing the signal into 
short bursts and slightly reducing the picture quality (Torikka 2007, 
Vihma 2007, Lehto 2006), but after these modifications, it was not 
possible to receive any regular DVB broadcasts with a handheld DVB-
H receiver or vice versa (Ala-Fossi 2010: 52–56).
Despite this incompatibility, the new modified version of DVB 
standard was considered to be a brilliant piece of European engineer-
ing, and the DVB-H project team of Nokia even received the Finnish 
Engineering Award in 2007. Later in the same year, the European 
Commission took a stand in favour of DVB-H and a year later added 
it to the EU List of Official Standards (Torikka 2007, EC 2007, EU 
2008). For a while, both the government and industry expectations 
over the success of the new European mobile television system as a 
converged broadcast platform for digital radio and mobile multimedia 
were very high, but the failure of DVB-H is now unquestionable. In 
2011, Finland and Italy were the last remaining countries in Europe 
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with commercial DVB-H services (de Renesse 2011). By March 2012, 
DVB-H services in Finland will be replaced with services based on 
another new version of digital television, DVB-T2 (MINTC 2011, 
Digita 2011).
Digital convergence of broadcasting in Europe 
– an opportunity lost?
The development and history of digital broadcasting technologies is ob-
viously a complex series of intermedial and international relationships 
rather than a straightforward process towards digital consolidation. 
European digital radio would not have been like DAB without the 
Euro-Japanese project to create the CD, the European pre-development 
of digital radio and audio systems and the Japanese HDTV proposal, 
which together set separate paths for the European development of 
television and radio. In addition, European television would not be 
digital without the American impact – and it would not be like DVB 
without the indirect and direct influence and sheer existence of the 
DAB system. The European systems were both, in turn, starting points 
for the Japanese development of ISDB, which was designed to provide 
mobility unlike Western television systems. Additionally, the ISDB 
system provided the reason for the development of the new European 
antidote called DVB-H.
Digitalisation per se does not necessarily lead to any kind of inte-
gration of different forms of media, but it can be one of the precon-
ditions for implementing an expansive convergence business strategy 
based on removing earlier technological, regulatory, political and legal 
barriers between existing markets. This neoliberal approach has been 
supported by technologically deterministic and circular argumenta-
tion: because technology was driving convergence, policies had to be 
changed and regulations removed, which in turn would increase and 
accelerate the economic process, making convergence function like a 
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‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 135). However, tech-
nologies are never the real driving force behind any policy changes, 
but socially shaped tools for certain socially defined practices, while 
their capacities and characteristics effectively set the limits for the 
political and economic goals of their use. The original idea of digital 
media convergence was based on a mistaken assumption that these 
limits would simply vanish or become indifferent through digitalisa-
tion. After it gained enough popularity and political importance, the 
gates for new and expanding digital business activities were opened 
through policy reforms. 
The European project for digitalisation of broadcasting has actu-
ally not failed in increasing digital media convergence because that was 
not even its original goal. As long as the digital television system was 
considered to be impossible to design, the idea of convergence did not 
have much impact on the development of broadcasting technologies. 
On the contrary, the fundamental economic motives of European 
media technology projects were to protect European markets and in-
dustries by creating new technological barriers. However, this setting 
changed dramatically when the unexpected breakthrough in digital 
television development and simultaneous difficulties in the analogue 
HDTV project made European politicians re-evaluate their high-tech-
nology policies and adopt a more neoliberal approach. Convergence, 
especially the integration of television and computer, was now one of 
the promises of the new digital future, which would create new com-
mercial markets and smooth the way towards the brave new informa-
tion society. The brand new interactive digital television supplementing 
telecom and computing services seemed to be a perfect way to both 
avoid the digital divide and create more digital dividend, while digital 
radio fighting for the same resources and support was already on the 
road towards political and economic marginalisation.
The most crucial decisions leading into digital divergence of ter-
restrial broadcasting in Europe were made in the early 1990s, when the 
DVB specifications were drafted. Another mobile digital broadcasting 
system would have been a direct threat to the DAB system still in its 
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infancy, and there was no evidence that European consumers would 
appreciate mobile reception of television. Finally, there were strong 
cultural, economic and organisational forces inside the national public 
broadcasting companies maintaining separate spheres for both broad-
cast mediums. Together, these factors led to the development of DVB, 
which in practice excluded the possibility for digital convergence of 
all broadcasting in Europe. This was not a problem for EBU members 
as long as they considered themselves primarily radio and television 
broadcasters, but it has not really fit together with the business strategies 
of commercial broadcasting or the new, more convergence-oriented 
digital strategy of Public Service Media adopted in the 2000s (EBU 
2002: 17, Bardoel and Lowe 2007).
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